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In early December, the U.S. President convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. His pledge was an end to decades of conflict in the unstable eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Weeks later, however, a starkly different approach to conflict emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President warned, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

This dichotomy encapsulates the central feature of the U.S. policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and conflict resolution—even as this fits with the nascent aerial operations in Nigeria is an open question.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative echoed this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This shift is major, but observers warn it is premature to gauge its impact. The approach is influenced by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis estimates this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Disinterest and Strains

In contrast to his immediate predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant disagreement has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Diplomacy and Conditional Action

An analogous standoff appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the forceful rhetoric may have pushed the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

An Echo of Other Powers

Observers see the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the revised strategy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.